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adjustments of wage subsidy that ¯x domestic unemployment in two
models of a small open economy with unemployment. We show that in
both settings the proposed policy reform improves welfare. This result
provides a simple but strong rationale for trade liberalization in the
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1 Introduction
Unemployment is a serious concern in any country, for which some coun-
tries either resist or hesitate trade liberalization. Stiglitz (2005, p. 70), for
example, says that `statistics, however, often under-represent the true level
of unemployment- for instance, the prevalent high levels of disguised un-
employment.'1) According to standard trade theory, reductions in trade
protection bene¯t a country, but simultaneously entail a negative income
distribution e®ect on the comparative disadvantage sector, possibly result-
ing in more unemployment. Then, one has a natural question: is it possible
to design a scheme of trade liberalization such that welfare improves with-
out increasing unemployment.
1) However, recent evidence more or less supports that trade liberalization is a driving
force of employment, e.g., WTO (2013, p. 236), Dutt et al. (2009), Felbermayr et
al. (2011), and Hasan et al. (2012).
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This paper provides an a±rmative answer to this question by using two
types of unemployment models of a small open economy. The ¯rst model,
which is originally developed by Brecher (1974), assumes economy-wide
unemployment due to a rigid wage prevailing in all sectors while the second
model, which dates back to Harris and Todaro (1970), focuses on urban
unemployment that stems from a rigid wage in the urban area.2) In both
models, we show that tari® reductions accompanied by adjustments of wage
subsidy that leave unemployment unchanged necessarily improve welfare.
This conclusion may serve as a helpful guide for practical policy-making
of trade liberalization mainly in developing countries that hesitate trade
liberalization due to the employment concern.
This paper proceeds as follows. Presenting a model of nationwide un-
employment, Section 2 considers the welfare e®ect of an unemployment-
neutral policy reform. Section 3 makes the same exercise in the Harris-
Todaro (1970) model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Economy-wide unemployment
This section incorporates economy-wide unemployment into a compet-
itive model of a small open country, say Home. Home imports Good 1,
which is subject to a speci¯c import tari® t, and exports Good 2 (nu-
meraire) that is freely traded.3) As remarked earlier, Brecher (1974) ¯rst
develops this model, but we formulate his model by using duality concepts.
Denoting by p and w a world price of Good 1 and a wage rate of Home
measured by Good 2, consider the following function:4)
2) Edwards and Edwards (1994) and Bhagwati et al. (1998) o®er a comparative
account of these models.
3) As shown later, our result is robust in the export tax case where t is negative.
4) See Neary (1985), Kreickemeier (2005), and Falvey and Kreickemeier (2007) for
more details.
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r(p+ t; w¡s) ´ max
y1;y2;L
f(p+ t)y1+ y2¡ (w¡s)L : (y1; y2; L) is feasibleg ;
where s is a wage subsidy, yi; i = 1; 2 is an output of Goods 1 and 2, and
L is labor employed in Home. The usual envelope properties yield
rp(p+ t; w ¡ s) ´ @r(p+ t; w ¡ s)
@(p+ t)
= y1
rw(p+ t; w ¡ s) ´ @r(p+ t; w ¡ s)
@(w ¡ s) = ¡L:
In words, partially di®erentiating r(¢) with respect to the price of Good 1
and the wage rate respectively yields the supply of Good 1 and the em-
ployment level (with a negative sign). Therefore, domestic unemployment
is de¯ned by L¡L = L+ rw(p+ t; w¡ s), where L is the labor endowment
of Home.
Using the above function, Home's income-expenditure equality is
e(p+ t; u) = r(p+ t; w ¡ s)¡ (w ¡ s)rw(p+ t; w ¡ s)
+ t [ep(p+ t; u)¡ rp(p+ t; w ¡ s)] ; (1)
where e(¢) is an expenditure function, the ¯rst line of the right-hand side is
the value of outputs, and the second line of the right-hand side represents
tari® revenue. Eq. (1) contains one endogenous variable u, with all the
other variables being exogenous. Totally di®erentiating it with respect to
u; t and s, we have
(eu ¡ tepu)du = [t(epp ¡ rpp)¡ (w ¡ s)rpw] dt+ [trpw + (w ¡ s)rww] ds:
(2)
We now de¯ne tari® reductions and adjustments of the wage subsidy
that leave domestic unemployment L + rw unchanged. Since a change in
unemployment is computed as d

L+ rw(p+ t; w ¡ s)

= rwpdt¡ rwwds, t
and s have to change according to
ds =
rpw
rww
dt; (3)
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so as to ¯x domestic unemployment, i.e., d
 
L+ rw

= 0. Eq. (3), cou-
pled with the properties rpw < 0 and rww > 0, suggests that the wage
subsidy must be raised (ds > 0) as tari®s are reduced (dt < 0) in order to
leave unemployment unaltered. The reason is that because reduced tari®s
decrease domestic production of Good 1 and domestic employment, the
initial employment level is restored by raising the wage subsidy.
Based on the preliminaries thus far, we explore the welfare e®ect of
the unemployment-neutral policy reform. For this purpose, we make an
assumption that is familiar in the literature:5)
Assumption 1. eu ¡ tepu > 0.
Then, we can arrive at:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, tari® reductions accompanied by
adjustments of the wage subsidy that ¯x domestic unemployment bene¯t
Home.
Proof. Substituting (3) into (2), the right-hand side of (2) becomes
t

rww(epp ¡ rpp) + r2pw

rww
dt:
Thus, computing the welfare e®ect of the proposed policy reform amounts
to making a comparative statics by using the above right-hand side. Straight-
forward manipulations lead to
dujdrw=0 =
t

rww(epp ¡ rpp) + r2pw

rww(eu ¡ tepu) dt:
5) This condition owes to Hatta (1977a, b). Falvey and Kreickemeier (2011, p. 284)
provide its justi¯cation by stating that `this is a clearly a very weak condition, and
hence the assumption ¹ > 0 is made throughout the literature on piecemeal trade
reform.' (¹ is eu ¡ tepu in our notation.)
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The strict convexity of r(¢), which implies rpp > 0; rww > 0 and rpprww¡
r2pw > 0, allows us to ¯nd that
rww(epp ¡ rpp) + r2pw = rwwepp| {z }
(¡)
¡rwwrpp + r2pw| {z }
(¡)
< 0:
Accordingly, we obtain
signfdujdrw=0g = ¡signft ¢ dtg;
implying that tari® reductions (dt < 0) result in dujdrw=0 > 0. jj
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. From the small coun-
try assumption, unemployment is the only market distortion, and hence
the ¯rst best outcome is given by free trade (t = 0) and w = s. And,
tari® reductions are replaced by wage subsidy increases so that domestic
unemployment is kept constant. Relating this observation to the above-
mentioned argument, we ¯nd that the economy approaches the ¯rst best
solution under this reform, leading to a positive welfare e®ect.
Figure 1 : Policy Reform and Welfare
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The above ¯nding may be better understood by using Figure 1. In
the ¯gure, the horizontal (resp. vertical) axis measures the tari® (resp.
wage subsidy), and an ellipse gives an iso-welfare contour. As depicted in
the ¯gure, the ¯rst best solution is given by the intersection of two lines
@u=@t = 0 and @u=@s = 0, which is (0; w) in the present model. According
to our policy recommendation, the tari® is reduced and the wage subsidy
is raised as the arrow shows. Therefore, the post-reform equilibrium is
necessarily inside the ellipse, implying that welfare improves as a result of
this reform.
3 Urban unemployment
While the previous section deals with economy-wide unemployment, in-
ternational and development economics has extensively utilized a model
that focuses on urban unemployment developed by Harris and Todaro
(1970). This section proves that the previous section's result survives the
Harris-Todaro model. By using the same notations and techniques as those
in the last section, we minimize the technical details.
The key in the Harris-Todaro model is that there is a wage di®erential
between the two sectors, and that the expected wage received in the urban
area equals that in the rural area:
L1
L1 + Lu
w = w2; (4)
where L1 and Lu are the labor employed in the Good 1 sector and the un-
employment, respectively, w is the wage paid in the Good 1 sector, and w2
is the counterpart in the Good 2 sector. In Eq. (4), w is exogenously given,
and ¯xed to a highly rigid level whereas w2 is endogenously determined.
De¯ning ¸ ´ Lu=L1, Eq. (4) can be rewritten as
(1 + ¸)w2 = w: (5)
In the literature, two versions of the Harris-Todaro models are developed,
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depending on the intersectoral capital mobility. Letting F i(Ki; Li); i =
1; 2 be a well-behaved production function, the supply side in the speci¯c
capital case is given by
(p+ t)F 1L(K1; L1) = w ¡ s
F 2L(K2; L2) = w2 ¡ s
(1 + ¸)w2 = w
(1 + ¸)L1 + L2 = L;
where subscript L stands for a partial derivative with respect to the labor
input, Ki; i = 1; 2 is speci¯c capital in each sector, and L is the labor
endowment. The ¯rst two equations are a pro¯t maximization condition
in each sector, and the last equation gives market-clearing of the labor
market. These equations determine L1; L2; w2 and ¸, given p+ t and s.
If, by contrast, capital is intersectorally mobile, the supply side is char-
acterized by6)
c1(r; w ¡ s) = p+ t
c2(r; w2 ¡ s) = 1
(1 + ¸)w2 = w
c1r(r; w ¡ s)y1 + c2r(r; w2 ¡ s)y2 = K
(1 + ¸)c1w(r; w ¡ s)y1 + c2w(r; w2 ¡ s)y2 = L;
where ci(¢); i = 1; 2 is a unit cost function, subscripts r and w refer to
a partial derivative with respect to the capital rental and wage, yi; i =
1; 2 is output of each good, and K is the capital endowment. The ¯rst
two equations are a condition for pro¯t maximization, and the last two
equations give market-clearing of the two factor markets. Five variables
6) The representation using the production function is left to the reader.
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r; w2; y1; y2 and ¸ are determined in this system.
7)
Whether or not capital is intersectorally mobile, the urban unemploy-
ment rate ¸ is given by a function of p + t and s as ¸(p + t; s).8) While
most of the previous works focus on either of the above speci¯cations, we
cover both cases by utilizing the duality technique developed by Beladi and
Chao (1993). To this end, let us consider the following function:
r(p+ t; ¸) ´ max
L1;L2
n
(p+ t)F 1(K1; L1) + F
2(K2; L2)
(1 + ¸)L1 + L2 = Lo ;
which has the usual envelope property:
rp(p+ t; ¸) ´ @r(p+ t; ¸)
@(p+ t)
= F 1(¢) = y1:
Substituting the pre-determined value ¸(p+ t; s) into this function, it be-
comes a function of p+ t and s as r(p+ t; ¸(p+ t; s)).
Then, the equilibrium of a small open country is given by
e(p+t; u) = r(p+t; ¸(p+t; s))+t [ep(p+ t; u)¡ rp(p+ t; ¸(p+ t; s))] ; (6)
which determines u, taking all the other variables as given. Totally di®er-
entiating (6) with respect to u; t and s, we get
(eu ¡ tepu)du = [r¸¸p + t(epp ¡ rpp ¡ rp¸¸p)] dt+ (r¸ ¡ trp¸)¸sds: (7)
Let us once again de¯ne the unemployment-neutral reform of tari® re-
ductions and wage subsidy adjustments. Since a change in ¸ is computed
as d¸ = ¸pdt + ¸sds, this requires the two tax/subsidy rates to change
according to
ds = ¡¸p
¸s
dt: (8)
In the case of economy-wide unemployment, the Home government raises
the wage subsidy in response to tari® reductions, but the same is not
7) Note that this system is recursive as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model; r; w2
and ¸ are determined in the top three equations only.
8) The exogenous variables other than p+ t and s are suppressed from the arguments
of ¸(¢).
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necessarily the case in the present setting. This is explained as follows.
Di®erentiating the immobile- and mobile-capital models, we have
immobile capital : ¸p =
(1 + ¸)2F 1LF
2
LL
(p+ t)F 1LL[(1 + ¸)L1F
1
LL ¡ F 2L ¡ s]
< 0
¸s =
(1 + ¸)

(p+ t)F 1LL + (1 + ¸)F
2
LL

(p+ t)F 1LL[(1 + ¸)L1F
1
LL ¡ F 2LL ¡ s]
< 0
mobile capital : ¸p =
(1 + ¸)c2r
w2c1rc2w
> 0; ¸s =
(1 + ¸)c1w
w2c1r

c2r
c2w
¡ c
1
r
c1w

:
If we make Neary's (1981) assumption that requires Good 1 to be capital-
intensive, ¸s < 0 follows in the mobile capital case as well. In other words,
under Neary's (1981) assumption, the unemployment rate ¸ naturally
falls as a result of an increase in the wage subsidy regardless of the in-
tersectoral mobility of capital. In contrast, the e®ect of p + t on ¸ di®ers
in the two speci¯cations for the following reason. In the immobile capital
mode, L1 has to increase in response to a rise in p + t in the equation
(p + t)F 1L(¢) = w ¡ s, from which ¸ ´ Lu=L1 falls. If capital is mobile
across sectors, a rise in p+ t raises r through c1(r; w¡ s) = p+ t. This, in
turn, lowers w2 in the equation c
2(r; w2 ¡ s) = 1, and leads ¸ to rise. But,
this di®erence in the sign of ¸p is irrelevant to the main conclusion to be
proved subsequently.
Substituting (8) into ds of (7), its right-hand side simpli¯es to t(epp ¡
rpp)dt. Then, a straightforward manipulation yields the welfare e®ect of
the unemployment-neutral policy reform as follows.
dujd¸=0 =
t(epp ¡ rpp)
eu ¡ tepu dt: (9)
Thus, we establish:
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, tari® reductions accompanied by
adjustments of the wage subsidy that ¯x domestic unemployment bene¯t
Home.
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Proof. It immediately follows from (epp ¡ rpp)=(eu ¡ tepu) < 0 that
sign

dujd¸=0
	
= ¡sign ft ¢ dtg :
Therefore, if the trade tax takes a form of an import tari® t > 0, the
present reform of trade liberalization (dt < 0) leads to dujd¸=0 > 0. jj
There is little to be explained in the immobile capital case since the
intuition behind Proposition 1 applies to this case. In contrast, the mobile
capital case should be separately explained. In this case, lower tari®s
reduce the capital rental and raise the wage in the Good 2 sector. Thus, the
intersectoral wage di®erential narrows, and the urban unemployment rate
declines since migration from the urban to rural area occurs. As a result,
the Home government can lower the wage subsidy, and the overall e®ect
on welfare becomes positive because tari®-distorted resource allocation is
(partially) removed without expanding unemployment.
Remark. We have thus far focused on the case of import tari®s, the
foregoing arguments are readily applied to the case of export taxes. If
the trade tax takes a form of an export tax, t is negative, and export tax
reductions are represented by dt > 0. Consequently, we have t ¢ dt < 0 and
du > 0.
4 Conclusion
This paper has theoretically proved that tari® reductions and wage sub-
sidy increases that neutralize the employment e®ect unambiguously im-
prove welfare. In addition, this conclusion is shown to survive both a
model of nationwide unemployment and a model of urban unemployment.
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Our result may be helpful in the practical policy-making of trade liberal-
ization in the sense that trade liberalization and employment protection
can be compatible.
Nevertheless, our a±rmative evaluation of trade liberalization admit-
tedly hinges on a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we have as-
sumed a small open country, following most of the existing literature on
tari®-tax reforms. However, unemployment is a phenomenon that is ob-
served in developed countries as well as developing countries. Hence, it is
important to check our result in a large-country setting. Second, our model
simply attributes unemployment to an exogenously rigid wage. However,
it is fruitful to develop a micro-founded model in which the rigid wage is
determined by solving some optimization problem. Extensions along these
lines are left as our future research agenda.
References
[1] Beladi, H. and C. Chao (1993), `Non-Traded Goods, Urban Unemployment
and Welfare in LDCs,' European Journal of Political Economy, 9(2), pp.
281-292.
[2] Bhagwati, J. N., A. Panagariya and T. N. Srinivasan (1998), Lectures on
International Trade, Cambridge: MIT Press.
[3] Brecher, R. A. (1974), `Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of
International Trade,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(1), pp. 98-116.
[4] Dutt, P., D. Mitra and P. Ranjan (2009), `International Trade and Unem-
ployment: Theory and Cross-National Evidence,' Journal of International
Economics, 78(1), pp. 32-44.
[5] Edwards, A. C. and S. Edwards (1994), `Labour Market Distortions and
Structural Adjustment in Developing Countries,' in Horton, S., R. Kan-
bur and D. Mazumdar (eds.), Labour Markets in an Era of Adjustment,
Washington D. C.: World Bank.
| 61 |
?????? 70 ?? 4 ?
[6] Falvey, R. and U. Kreickemeier (2007), `Tari® Reforms with Rigid Wages'
Economic Theory, 41, pp. 23-39.
[7] Falvey, R. and U. Kreickemeier (2011), `The Theory of Trade Policy and
Reform,' in Bernhofen, D., D. Greenaway, R. Falvey and U. Kreickemeier
(eds.) Palgrave Handbook of International Trade: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
265-294.
[8] Felbermayr, G., J. Prat and H-J. Schmerer (2011), `Trade and Unemploy-
ment: What Do the Data Say?' European Economic Review, 55(6), pp.
741-758.
[9] Harris, J. R. and M. P. Todaro (1970), `Migration, Unemployment and
Development: A Two-Sector Analysis,' American Economic Review 60(1),
pp. 126-142.
[10] Hasan, R., D. Mitra, P. Ranjan and R. N. Ahsan (2012), `Trade Liberal-
ization and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence from India,' Journal of
Development Economics, 97(2), pp. 269-280.
[11] Hatta, T. (1977a), `A Theory of Piecemeal Policy Recommendations,' Re-
view of Economic Studies, 44(1), pp. 1-21.
[12] Hatta, T. (1977b), `A Recommendation for a Better Tari® Structure,'
Econometrica, 45(8), pp. 1859-1869.
[13] Kreickemeier, U. (2005), `Unemployment and the Welfare E®ects of Trade
Policy,' Canadian Journal of Economics 38, pp. 194-210.
[14] Neary, J. P. (1981), `On the Harris-Todaro Model with Intersectoral Capital
Mobility,' Economica, 48(191), pp. 219-234.
[15] Neary, J. P. (1985), `International Factor Mobility, Minimum Wage Rates,
and Factor-Price Equalization: A Synthesis,' Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 100(3), pp. 551-570.
[16] Stiglitz, J. E. (2005), Fair Trade for All, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[17] World Trade Organization (2013), WTO Report 2013.
| 62 |
